Downloadable Conditional Access System
part 5/8 · 11.7 KB total
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It was asserted by proponents that DCAS provided greater security for the cable industry because it allows them to change their entire security structure by downloading new software into host devices. If a particular encryption algorithm is cracked, it could be replaced by another one. Detractors noted that if the physical circuitry is compromised, it may not be replaced as is the case with CableCARDs. Some DCAS scenarios could use removable cards: OCAP-based devices may incorporate internal support for a kind of "smart card" (similar to the current SIM chip in a GSM cell-phone) to identify the subscriber and provide further protection. Proponents asserted that DCAS is more supportable since DCAS devices would not require a qualified technician to install the card. Detractors asserted that the final version of DCAS may require a physical card insertion, and that technicians are not required to insert CableCARDs anyway, since they are merely the same kind of cards that consumers routinely insert in their laptops. It was asserted that if cable companies were finally forced to agree on a standard for two-way communication that CableCARDs will be able to be remotely configured as would be the case with DCAS devices.
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